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ABSTRACT
Pervasive communications extend social networking by en-
abling users to share local contextual data in a peer-to-peer
fashion by using their mobile devices. Such pervasive social
networks bring along new privacy challenges in terms of lo-
cation and data privacy. In order to address some of these
challenges, there has been research on privacy preserving
mechanisms and on privacy measurement techniques. How-
ever, little has been done so far on conditioning users’ com-
munications to their privacy. For example, a user may com-
municate personal information when he feels private enough
and refrain from communicating when he feels “exposed”.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of privacy-triggered
communications that enables users to make communication
decisions based on their privacy level. To do so, we provide
tools and techniques to visualize privacy and control com-
munications. We evaluate existing privacy metrics and an-
alyze with simulations the network performance when the
underlying communications are privacy-triggered. We also
provide an implementation of the concept on a testbed of
mobile devices.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive communications enable mobile devices to
wirelessly share data with each other in a peer-to-peer
fashion without user intervention. As more mobile de-
vices become equipped with peer-to-peer technologies,
such as WiFi and Bluetooth, friends or strangers can
use their mobile phones to dynamically exchange in-
formation when they are in proximity. These peer-to-
peer communications enable context-awareness on mo-
bile devices and thus connect Internet applications to
the real world. For example, users can share infor-
mation in real-time for local-area social networking [8,
16], dating [1, 2, 37], personal safety [43], or micro-
blogging [24]. These applications enable users to enter
information in their mobile phones, it is then shared
with other phones nearby unbeknownst to their users,
effectively obtaining pervasive social networks.
Some users of online web services have an aversion to
sharing their contextual information with infrastructure-
based services because of privacy concerns [29]. Sharing
personal information locally in a peer-to-peer fashion
prevents this problem, but leaks personal information
to wireless eavesdroppers, thus making possible the con-
tinuous tracking of users location and habits. In par-
ticular, personal information exchanged between mobile
devices can identify their owners and threaten their pri-
vacy. The promises of peer-to-peer wireless sharing of
information may turn into a pervasive nightmare if user
privacy is not protected.
The upcoming generation of mobile computing thus
requires mechanisms to share information anonymously
in a peer-to-peer fashion. Privacy enhancing technolo-
gies for wireless communications have become a central
topic of research and various approaches to user pri-
vacy have been suggested. Several solutions propose to
remove identifiers [27] from exchanged messages or to
change them over time [13, 53] to make it more difficult
for an adversary to link data to users. Other solutions
rely on anonymous authentication, such as group signa-
tures or anonymous credentials, to authenticate and/or
encrypt communications.
Anonymous authentication and data encryption en-
able users to share data with friends (with whom they
share security credentials) in a privacy-preserving fash-
ion. Nevertheless, such mechanisms do not work for
sharing data with strangers because of the unavailabil-
ity of shared security credentials. One solution for pre-
serving privacy in this scenario is to share data only if
several nodes are in proximity (as otherwise there is only
one possible sender for a message). This allows users to
share information in a privacy-preserving fashion with
strangers.
In this work, we introduce the concept of privacy-
triggered communications that enables users (or their
devices) to make communication decisions based on their
privacy level. In contrast with existing approaches, it
allows users to regulate the sharing of their information
by making dynamic privacy-based decisions. Hence, the
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advantage of our approach is that users can identify ap-
propriate moments to share data with nearby nodes: for
example, share intimate data only if their privacy level
is sufficiently high.
To do so, we compute user privacy based on sim-
ple network characteristics and on well-known metrics.
We then implement efficient tools to visualize privacy
and user controls for privacy-triggered communications
on a testbed of mobile devices. Privacy-triggered com-
munications affect the response time between devices
(often delaying communications). Hence, we also eval-
uate the introduced delay on large networks using ns-2
simulations and derive the relation between privacy and
quality-of-service of context-aware applications. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to pro-
pose, evaluate and implement such concept for mobile
devices. With our approach, we tackle one of the im-
portant issues that has hindered the use of peer-to-peer
wireless communications between mobile devices.
2. STATE OF THE ART
Context and location awareness turn phones into ubiq-
uitous tools for quantifying personal patterns and habits.
Several efforts from the industry and academia have
proposed context-aware platforms for mobile phones.
Dey, Salber and Abowd [20] introduce a conceptual
framework for context-aware systems architecture that
Korpipaa and Mantyjarvi [39] extend to mobile phones.
Raento et al. [44] implement a prototype for Nokia phones
that enable context-aware applications. Recently, Nokia
introduced an awareness networking solution [8] for the
transport of small amounts of locally relevant data in a
power-efficient manner between mobile phones. Their
work is a first step towards making pervasive commu-
nications energy-efficient. We consider the proposal
of Nokia and focus on privacy-problems introduced by
context-awareness for social networking applications.
There are several solutions to provide privacy in a
pervasive environment. Confab, proposed by Hong et
al., is the first toolkit for facilitating the development of
privacy-sensitive ubiquitous computing applications [34].
SmokeScreen is another proposal by Cox et al. that in-
troduces flexible privacy controls for presence-sharing [18].
Our work complements both Confab and SmokeScreen
by introducing privacy regulation controls that deal with
data sharing. Another field of privacy research focuses
on privacy-aware routing in ubiquitous networks [9, 52].
These schemes complement our approach to provide pri-
vacy when multi-hop routing is required. Other mech-
anisms protect user location privacy by using multi-
ple pseudonyms [13, 53], path-cloaking [26, 31], or k-
anonymity [35]. In our work, we assume the use of
such mechanisms to protect user location privacy. Sim-
ilarly, previous work studies the protection of privacy in
people sensing applications [17]. Our work focuses in-
stead on the peer-to-peer interactions between mobile
devices. Another related work is privacy-aware data
sharing in online social networks [41]. The authors pro-
pose to measure the sensitivity and visibility of infor-
mation in social networks and provide a privacy score
as a feedback for users to decide with whom to share
information. Similarly, our work suggest mechanisms
to share data but focuses on peer-to-peer wireless com-
munications.
As investigated by Altman in a sociological study in
the seventies [10], users manage their privacy as a di-
alectic and dynamic regulation process. In other words,
users decide to share data depending on context. Later
work studied how the management of privacy changes
with the evolution of technology [42] and suggested that
privacy management should be a dynamic response to
circumstances rather than a static enforcement of rules.
Yet educating users and giving precise privacy controls
to dynamically tune privacy can make things worse [49]
because it becomes increasingly difficult for users to un-
derstand the mechanisms underpinning the technology.
Instead, in this work, we propose simple privacy metrics
to help users regulate their privacy dynamically depend-
ing on the context.
Note that it is possible to identify devices relying on
their distinctive characteristics (i.e., fingerprints) at the
physical, link, OS, and application layers. At the phys-
ical layer, the wireless transceiver has a wireless finger-
print that can be used to identify it in the long term
using modulation-based techniques [15], transient-based
techniques [19], amplitude-based techniques [50] or a
combination of features [28, 45]. However, these tech-
niques are only evaluated with specific scenarios (static,
small scale experiments with expensive hardware) and
countermeasures could be developed. Hence, in mo-
bile networks, it remains unclear how much identifying
information can be extracted from the physical layer.
At the link layer, it is possible to distinguish between
a number of devices and drivers [23]. At the applica-
tion layer, devices can also be identified based on clock
skews [38]. However, such techniques require an ac-
tive adversary and can be countered by ignoring the
requests sent by the adversary. Similarly, a reduction
of the differences between drivers would limit the ef-
fectiveness of such attacks. Note that independently
from the presence of fingerprinting attacks, higher layer
privacy mechanisms remain useful. Some applications
may, for example, require storing location traces for a
while (e.g., for congestion analysis).
3. SYSTEMMODEL
In this section, we introduce the assumptions made
throughout the paper.
3.1 Network and Communication Model
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We study a pervasive network composed of autonomous
mobile devices equipped with one or more wireless in-
terfaces (e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth). Devices can com-
municate with each other in an ad hoc fashion upon
coming in radio range. Ad hoc (or peer-to-peer) wire-
less communications complement communications with
an infrastructure such as cellular or WLAN.
Mobile nodes have an always-on wireless interface for
ad hoc communications, which allows for continuous
neighborhood awareness. Without loss of generality,
we assume that mobile users advertise their presence by
periodically broadcasting proximity beacons containing
the nodes identifying information. This beaconing can
be done anonymously using a privacy-preserving mech-
anism such as [12, 18]. Moreover, beacons do not con-
tain intimate information and thus do not pose a data
privacy threat. After discovering their neighborhood,
mobile devices can automatically exchange information
unbeknownst to their users. Typically, the shared in-
formation relates to users’ personal interests and con-
text. The shared data can either be generated on-the-
fly based on the device sensors or be preloaded on the
device by users.
As suggested by Athiainen et al. in [8], we consider
that communications between nodes are small in size
(100 bytes per packets) to guarantee a low computa-
tion overhead on the mobile nodes. Thus, small packets
make peer-to-peer communications energy-efficient and
enable always-on networking.
As commonly assumed in pervasive networks, the shar-
ing of information relies on a push/pull system: Mobile
nodes can push information to the network by mak-
ing it public, or pull information from nearby nodes by
asking questions. For example, a node can advertise
(push) the allergen concentration measured in another
region of the network, or ask (pull) its neighbor their
relationship status. Devices then collect and archive the
published information for later use by the owner of the
mobile device. The decision to push/pull information
is made by the devices unbeknownst to their owners.1
Without loss of generality, we consider that messages
are broadcasted in the following format:
|| User pseudonym || Message ||
We consider that communications are multi-hop to
a certain maximum hop-count defined by the system.
Hence, traditional routing algorithms can be used [36].
3.2 Threat Model
We consider an adversary that attempts to obtain in-
formation about mobile nodes based on observed mes-
1Note that to facilitate the exchange of information, nodes
may be grouped into communities based on their interest
and social affiliation. Like publish/subscribe systems, com-
munities enable users to publish information in a coordi-
nated fashion, and to subscribe to certain topics.
sages. In practice, the adversary can be a rogue individ-
ual that deploys its own infrastructure (e.g., by placing
eavesdropping devices in the network) or a set of mali-
cious legitimate nodes. In the worst case, the adversary
is global : it has a complete coverage and eavesdrops
communications throughout the entire network. The
adversary has the capability to use directional anten-
nas to detect the source of transmissions.
The goal of the adversary is to track users’ locations
and break his data privacy. By collecting messages to-
gether with their location, the adversary learns a de-
vice’s whereabouts and can implicitly obtain the true
identity of the owner of the device from the analysis
of pseudonymous location traces [13, 33]. Similarly, by
observing the exchanged messages, the adversary can
learn intimate information about users and their social
networks.
Note that even if messages are encrypted, the adver-
sary (being a legitimate member of the network) au-
thenticates himself to nearby nodes to establish com-
munications. Hence, in this work, we consider without
loss of generality that all messages are unencrypted.
4. PRIVACY-TRIGGEREDCOMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we introduce the concept of privacy-
triggered communications. It consists of a privacy-wrapper
that dynamically determines when to share personal
information (Fig. 1). Intuitively, the privacy-wrapper
monitors the surroundings of mobile users and deter-
mines whether the context provides enough privacy for
users to share their personal information. Hence, the
context acts as a trigger of the networking activity of
the nodes.
In practice, mobile phones check their privacy level
and then decide to push/pull data from neighboring
nodes. An example where privacy-triggered commu-
nications can be useful is an application used by com-
muters in the subways of Tehran, Iran. Mobile-phone
owners use Bluetooth to circumvent prohibition laws
and exchange political jokes or sexually-related content
in the metro. The large number of people in the metro
provides an appropriate level of anonymity [37]. In this
case, privacy-triggered communication is manually en-
forced by communicating in high density areas such as
metros.
4.1 Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
In wireless networks, user privacy mostly depends on
the protection of data privacy and location privacy. An
adversary should not be able to link collected data (data
privacy) and locations (location privacy) to a user’s
identity. These two problems are interdependent and
need to be considered together.
In order to prevent trivial linking of users’ data and
locations by the adversary, we assume that the mobile
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Figure 1: Illustration of the privacy-wrapper
for privacy-triggered networking. The privacy-
wrapper uses contextual information to control
the sharing of user information.
devices use pseudonymous communications. Any suit-
able pseudonym mechanism can be used. For exam-
ple, mobile devices can use multiple pseudonyms over
time [13, 53], remove pseudonyms from their messages,
or use anonymous credentials. By means of these pseu-
donym mechanisms, mobile users can achieve a basic
level of anonymity. In addition to these mechanisms,
the overall privacy of users is also context-dependent.
For example, a single user is not private even if he regu-
larly changes pseudonyms, but can achieve some anony-
mity by mixing in a group of people (and ofcourse use
and change pseudonyms). Such context-derived privacy
can be measured using various metrics, as discussed
next.
4.2 Privacy Metrics
In order to use privacy-triggered communications, mo-
bile devices must monitor the level of privacy provided
by their context. To do so, we rely on well-known pri-
vacy metrics that capture the level of privacy of mobile
nodes.
For any message sent, the k-anonymity metric [48]
guarantees that k nodes might be the originators of the
message. In wireless networks, nodes are k-anonymous
if they have k − 1 neighbors. Yet, in wireless networks,
an adversary using directional antennas can still use the
wireless signal power to find the originator of a mes-
sage [11]. In this work, we model the strength of the
adversary with a confusion distance that is the maxi-
mum distance in meters between two devices, where an
attacker is not able to distinguish who among the two is
the originator of the transmission. Hence, nodes must
estimate how distant they are from their neighbors. In
its simplest form, distance can be estimated from the
received signal strength. Note that there are more elab-
orate schemes that allow to bound the distance between
mobile users [51]. Thus, the level of privacy brought by
k-anonymity not only depends on the number of nodes
k, but also on the ability of the adversary to distinguish
nodes from their neighbors.
The adversary may also have statistical information
about the originator of a message. To take this into ac-
count, several researchers [21, 46] proposed to compute
an effective anonymity set that measures the level of
uncertainty of the adversary in guessing the originator
of a message (i.e., the entropy of the anonymity set).
User location privacy also depends on the traceability
of nodes. Even if interactions between users are ano-
nymous, the traceability of nodes’ locations over time
enables an adversary to obtain mobile users real identi-
ties [12, 32, 40]. There are various metrics, as classified
by Shokri et al. in [47], for measuring the success of the
adversary in tracking nodes locations. Clustering-based
metrics measure the error of the adversary in assigning
events from the set of all possible events to users [22,
30]. Traceability-based metrics measure the extent to
which a user can be tracked with high certainty by the
adversary [31, 33]. Distortion-based metrics measure
the distortion between the actual trajectory of users
and the trajectory guessed by the adversary [47].
In practice, metrics that measure the traceability usu-
ally require a priori knowledge of mobility patterns of
the mobile users. This information is hard to estimate.
In addition, several metrics do not provide a real-time
measure of privacy and rely instead on data collected
over a period of time. For these reasons, it is difficult
to use these metrics in our work.
We consider simple metrics that can help estimate the
level of privacy of the nodes. More specifically, we con-
sider the k-anonymity metric that measures the neigh-
borhood density, i.e., the number of nodes in proximity.
Then, we model the strength of the adversary by con-
sidering various confusion distances. In the future, we
intend to test our system with more elaborate metrics.
5. SYSTEMARCHITECTUREANDDESIGN
In this section, we introduce a privacy-triggered com-
munication application for pervasive social networks.
Figure 2 shows the architecture of our application. The
application provides users with a Messaging Service for
sharing data with other users. As mentioned earlier,
the Messaging Service is just one way of generating and
sharing local contextual data in pervasive social net-
works. Other types of information exchange may share
data from the various device sensors (e.g., camera, GPS,
etc.). The application assumes the existence of a per-
vasive social networking platform such as the Nokia
awareness platform [8]. The awareness platform pro-
vides the basic user management and communication
primitives such as joining, leaving and revoking users,
sending messages, receiving messages and forwarding
and routing messages to the destination. In addition to
user interfaces for generating data, the Messaging Ser-
vice also provides tools for visualizing privacy and data
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regulation based on privacy.
The Messaging Service passes the data to the Mes-
sage Controller. The Message Controller regulates the
transmission of data to the network depending on the
current privacy level and the privacy level required for
the data. The current user privacy level is calculated by
the Privacy Calculator. The Privacy Calculator com-
putes the current level of user privacy based on the
network statistics provided by the Data Analyzer and
the privacy metric chosen by the user. The Data Ana-
lyzer computes important network statistics for use in
the privacy level computation from the network data
provided by the Awareness platform or optionally by
a third-party packet sniffing tool. We now describe in
more detail each of the four main components.
The Data Analyzer component shown in Figure 3
provides a Data Sanitizer that takes the raw network
input from the awareness platform and/or the Packet
Sniffer and eliminates unwanted and duplicate informa-
tion. The Data Sanitizer passes the sanitized data to
the Data Parser that captures information useful from
the point-of-view of privacy computation. The Network
Statistic Extractor uses this data together with previ-
ously archived network data to generate and update
useful network statistics. This process of data aggrega-
tion and statistic generation by the Network Statistic
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from Data Analyzer
Privacy level to Plotter
Standard 
Metrics
User Metric 
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Notification 
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Figure 4: Privacy calculator.
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Extractor is also useful in reducing the amount of net-
work data required to be stored locally on the devices.
The Data Controller service controls the flow of these
network statistics to the Privacy Calculator.
The Privacy Calculator shown in Figure 4 provides a
metric selection service that allows users to select the
specific privacy metric to be used during privacy com-
putation. The Privacy Index Calculator computes the
privacy value of the user, at regular time intervals, from
the network statistics and based on the user-selected
metric. This privacy level is passed to a Notification
Agent that issues notifications to the Plotter service for
visualization purposes and to the Message Scheduler of
the Message Controller component.
The Message Controller component, as shown in Fig-
ure 5, is responsible for controlling the messages in and
out of the application. It contains a Message Sched-
uler that takes messages together with the required pri-
vacy level chosen by the user and decides if the message
is ready to be sent to the awareness platform. If the
current privacy level is greater than or equal to the
desired privacy level for the message, then the mes-
sage is instantly scheduled for delivery to the awareness
platform. If the current privacy level is smaller than
the desired privacy level then the message is stored in
the local message buffer for delivery at a later point in
time. The Message Scheduler receives regular interrupts
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from the Notification Agent of the Privacy Calculator
with the current privacy level. Everytime an interrupt
is received, the Message Scheduler checks the Message
Buffer for messages that need to be transmitted at (or
below) the current privacy level and schedules them for
delivery to the awareness platform. The Message Sched-
uler uses a Message Processor to control the messages
to and from the Messaging tool and the awareness plat-
form.
The privacy visualizer controls, as shown in Figure 6,
are a part of the user interface along with the Messaging
Service. It provides a Plotter service that takes the pri-
vacy value provided by the Privacy Calculator and plots
a visual cue of the privacy for the user. This visual cue
is indicative of the current level of user’s privacy. The
visualizer control also provides a Level Selector control
that allows users to select the desired level of privacy,
relative to the level indicated by the Plotter, for partic-
ular messages. This selection indicates the privacy level
at which that message is expected to be sent out on the
awareness network. The message is then regulated ac-
cordingly by the Message Controller.
Finally, the privacy-triggered communication appli-
cation can optionally employ a third-party Packet Snif-
fer such as Wireshark [3] or tcpdump. The main use
of the Packet Sniffer is to collect network data that
cannot be obtained directly from the awareness plat-
form. This can help in better estimating users privacy.
For hardware specific design constraints (such as simul-
taneous operation of the awareness platform and the
sniffer on the same wireless interface), we do not em-
ploy a Packet Sniffer for the data collection operations.
Thus in the current implementation, we only use the
data provided by platform. Alternatively, in order to
avoid using third-party sniffing tools, privacy computa-
tion specific network data collection procedures can also
be integrated within the awareness platform itself. In
summary, this is just a system specific constraint, which
does not affect the overall application architecture.
Figure 7: Nokia N810 running the privacy-
triggered communication application.
6. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
The privacy-triggered communication application is
developed and tested on a testbed of Nokia N810 devices
as shown in Figure 7. In the following sections, we
give an overview of the implementation, including the
details about the hardware and software platforms and
the various application components2.
6.1 Hardware and Software Platforms
We develop the proposed privacy-triggered communi-
cation application on top of the Nokia awareness plat-
form [8] using the python programming language3 (ver-
sion 2.6.4) in the Linux (Ubuntu 9.04) environment.
A research prototype of the awareness platform, called
AwareNet4, was developed for the Nokia N810 mobile
devices by Nokia Research Center, Helsinki. AwareNet
is a power-efficient, always-on, and fully distributed mes-
saging system for mobile devices such as Nokia N810s.
AwareNet uses peer-to-peer wireless connections between
devices (in a connectionless fashion) to carry very small-
sized local contextual information between clients with-
out human intervention. AwareNet implements an effi-
cient query-reply mechanism, with a smart flooding al-
gorithm to disseminate data queries and a smart routing
algorithm to route back replies. AwareNet also provides
other network, link and physical layer functionalities to
make the entire process very power efficient. AwareNet
is written in C on the Maemo platform [6]. Maemo is an
open-source Linux-based operating system used in the
Nokia N810 devices. In summary, AwareNet provides a
2A video illustrating our implementation is available at:
http://icapeople.epfl.ch/freudiger/videos/PTNVideo.mp4.
username: submission, password: mobisys10
3PyCairo [4] and PyGtk [5] libraries were used for the GUI.
4AwareNet is a research platform and not currently available
commercially.
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platform for implementing the notion of pervasive social
networks introduced earlier.
6.2 Application
Let us first describe the basic operation of our privacy-
triggered application by means of state diagram as shown
in Figure 8. By default, the application is in the Idle
state. When a new message is received from the AwareNet
platform, the application transitions to the Log Data
state and logs the received message to the local storage.
This storage maintains a short history of the network
data and is used to compute network statistics and the
privacy level of the user. Once completed, the appli-
cation returns to the Idle state and waits for a new
message either received from the AwareNet platform
or generated by the user. When the user generates a
new message, the application transitions to the Mes-
sage state. In the Message state, the current privacy
level is checked. If the privacy level required in the mes-
sage is less than or equal to the current privacy level,
as determined in the Check Privacy state, the message
is sent to the AwareNet platform. Otherwise the mes-
sage is stored locally in the Message Buffer. While in
the Idle state, the application also transitions regularly
to the Message state to check if there are any messages
in the Message Buffer that now satisfy the privacy re-
quirement. If there are such messages, then they are
sent to the AwareNet platform. Similarly, while in the
Idle state, the application regularly transitions to the
Set Privacy state to update the network statistics and
the current user privacy level.
The actual prototype application and its user inter-
face is illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. We can see from
Figure 9 that the application provides a messaging or
chat tool, similar to other popular IM tools, to enable
Privacy IndicatorPrivacy meter
Chat Network graph
Figure 9: Privacy-triggered communication ap-
plication.
users to send and receive messages from nearby users
over the AwareNet platform. Note that pseudonyms
are not changed while users are chatting. Let us discuss
the privacy specific components in the user interface of
the application.
6.2.1 Privacy Visualization
In Figure 9, we can see that the privacy meter, lo-
cated above the chat control, displays the current level
of user privacy based on the privacy metric chosen by
the user. A privacy indicator (similar to the wireless
signal strength indicator) is also provided in the task
bar on the top right of the device display. This indica-
tor can be used by the user to view the privacy level in
the case the application is minimized or inactive. The
network graph is located on the right-hand side of the
chat control. Users can use the network graph to view
other members in the vicinity of their device. The rel-
ative distances to these neighbors is visible from the
network graph. The application also provides a privacy
history graph in another tab on the right-hand side of
the chat control. The history graph, as shown in Fig-
ure 10 (b), displays the evolution of user’s privacy over
the last 60 seconds.
6.2.2 Privacy Metric Selection
Users can choose the metric for measuring privacy by
using the privacy metric selection control, as shown in
Figure 10 (a). As discussed before, currently we have
only implemented the well-known k-anonymity metric
that measures privacy based on the neighborhood of
users and the confusion distance to these neighbors.
Implementation of other metrics is an ongoing work.
Privacy metrics implemented in this application are re-
stricted by the amount of information provided by the
7
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Privacy-triggering controls in the application (a) Privacy metric selection control (b)
Privacy visualization, set privacy threshold and privacy history visualization controls.
platform.
6.2.3 Communication Controller
From Figure 10 (b), we can see that below the pri-
vacy meter is located a slider control that can be used
for triggering communications based on user privacy.
The user can select the position of the slider, with re-
spect to the current privacy level shown in the privacy
meter above the slider, to indicate the privacy level at
which he wants to exchange messages. After choosing
and fixing the position of the slider, all messages to be
sent thereafter are associated with the privacy level in-
dicated by the slider. These messages will be sent on
the network by the application only when the desired
privacy level is reached. The user can use this control to
regulate his communications based on his current pri-
vacy level, for example, select a low privacy level for
sending general data and a high privacy level for send-
ing much more intimate information.
It is obvious that privacy-triggered communications
will affect the overall quality-of-service (QoS) of users
in the network, i.e., the communication delay. Due to
the limitations (in terms of size) of the current testbed,
we perform network simulations to observe the effect of
privacy-triggered communications on the QoS in large
mobile networks. The results of these simulations are
discussed in the following section.
7. NETWORK PERFORMANCE
In this section, we perform simulation experiments
using the ns-2 network simulator [7] in order to analyze
the impact of privacy-triggering on user communica-
tions in large-sized networks. Results from these simula-
tions provide insights on how simple privacy constraints
on user communications affect the QoS in pervasive so-
cial networks, and how this QoS evolves with changes in
user mobility and the underlying mobility area. These
simulations are useful in evaluating the critical network
parameters required to maintain a reasonable QoS of
user communications while providing the desired level of
user privacy. In the following section, we first describe
our precise simulation setup. After that, we discuss
the outcome of the conducted simulation experiments
and analyze the impact of privacy-triggered communi-
cations.
7.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation setup consists of wireless mobile de-
vices moving over a two-dimensional (rectangular), un-
obstructed terrain. All devices in the simulation are
similar and the initial positions of these devices are
uniformly chosen over the two dimensional area. The
devices communicate in a peer-to-peer fashion using a
wireless radio similar to a 914MHz Lucent WaveLAN
DSSS. The physical, link and network layer proper-
ties of these devices are summarized in Table 1. As
Table 1: Properties of Wireless Devices
Parameters Value
Antenna Omnidirectional
Antenna Gain 1.0
Antenna Height 1.5m
Radio frequency 914MHz
Radio propagation TwoRayGround
Radio range (default) 250m
MAC 802.11
Routing protocol AODV (RFC 3561)
discussed earlier in Section 3, wireless devices commu-
nicate with each other by sending small-sized packets.
The packet size that we consider in this simulation has
a constant length of 100 bytes.
Each device sends two types of packets, namely bea-
con packets and data packets, at pre-defined regular
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intervals. Beacon packets are used for neighbor discov-
ery, hence beacon packet intervals are kept small, for
example, 1 second. The actual data that devices want
to exchange are sent as data packets. Data packets are
sent less frequently as compared to the beacon pack-
ets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each
device has a data packet to be sent every 15 seconds.
The QoS measurements in these simulations are done
only with respect to the data packets. All packets are
sent as broadcasts; beacon packets are only broadcast
up to 1 hop, whereas data packets are broadcast up to
m hops. For the current simulations, we assume that
m is a constant for all data packets and its value is
3. Each device maintains an application layer buffer to
store data packets that cannot be immediately sent on
the network because of the required privacy level. In
these simulations, we assume a large local buffer of 50
KB, which is enough to hold a maximum of 500 data
packets. This is a reasonable assumption considering
the excellent data storage capabilities of current wire-
less mobile phones.
The simulations are carried out for two different types
of random mobility models in which the entire mobility
is divided into a number of short trips. The first mobil-
ity model that we use in the current simulations is the
classical Random Waypoint model with pauses (RW) in
which the nodes move (in each trip) on randomly cho-
sen straight line segments on the two-dimensional area
at uniform speeds. At the end of each trip along the
line segment, the node pauses for some time. After the
pause, it chooses uniformly at random the next end-
point from the two dimensional area and a speed below
some maximum speed and moves along that line seg-
ment. In our simulations, we use the above random
waypoint model with parameters as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters for RW mobility model
Parameters Value
Simulation area 500m x 500m
Average node speed 5 m/sec
Average pause time 10 secs
We also perform simulations using a more realistic
model, called the Random Waypoint on a City selection
(RWC). In this model, the rectangular area consists of a
fixed set of line segments (signifying roads) and each is
assigned a maximum speed. Nodes can only move along
these line segments. At the end of each trip, a node se-
lects uniformly at random a destination point on the
intersection of one of these segments and moves along
the shortest path from its original point to the destina-
tion point. A node can optionally pause between trips.
Le Boudec and Vojnovic´ [14] extensively study the sta-
bility and time-invariability properties of such mobility
models. They provide algorithms and tools to initial-
Figure 11: West University Place, Texas, USA
city map.
ize node mobility state so that the distribution of the
node state is time-stationary throughout a simulation.
We use their tool to generate the required random mo-
bility patterns. For the RWC mobility model, we use
node mobility patterns on a random U.S. city map, as
shown in Figure 11. Other simulation parameters for
this mobility model are outlined in Table 3.
Table 3: Parameters for RWC mobility model
Parameters Value
Simulation area 1200m x 1200m
Number of roads 1188
Number of intersections 383
Average speed on all roads 5 m/sec
Average pause time 10 secs
As discussed earlier in Section 4, each data packet is
associated with a required privacy level that symbolizes
the privacy level that needs to be attained by the device
in order for the packet to be sent on the network. Here,
we use a simple k-anonymity metric to determine the
privacy level of nodes. In this metric, the privacy level
of a node in a given time interval, for a given confus-
ing distance d, is the total number of neighbors5 within
distance d of the node. In order to observe the system
response to adversaries with varying capabilities, we re-
peat the simulations for various values of the confusion
distance; low confusion distances for strong adversaries
and high confusion distances for very weak adversaries.
In the current simulations, we choose k = 6 for all the
nodes. In other words, for each data packet and for a
given confusing distance d, each device needs at least
5 neighbors within a distance of d meters (in a fixed
time interval) for the data packet to be sent out on the
network.
5Device B is a neighbor of device A if A can directly hear
packets sent by B (in 1 hop)
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7.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we outline the two different simula-
tion scenarios for privacy-triggered communications and
discuss the results of these simulations. In the first sce-
nario, all the wireless devices or nodes follow the classi-
cal random waypoint model (with pauses) as outlined in
the previous section. In this scenario, we run the simu-
lations for an increasing number of nodes from 20 up to
100 nodes in steps of 20 nodes and for increasing values
of confusion distance from 50m up to 250m in steps of
50m. Each simulation is run for a total duration of 5000
secs. All other parameters are as discussed in the ear-
lier section. Next, we repeat the simulations using the
random waypoint on a city selection mobility model in-
stead of the classical random waypoint model. All other
simulation parameters remain unchanged. The results
of these simulations are discussed in the following two
sections.
7.2.1 Simulation Results for RW Mobility Model
The results of the simulation runs using the classical
random waypoint model (with pauses) are outlined in
Figure 12. For each simulation run, we record the fol-
lowing three statistics that measure the QoS provided
by the system. The first statistic is the average de-
lay before data packets are transmitted on the network.
This delay is the difference (in seconds) between the
time the data packet is originally scheduled and the
time it is actually broadcast, i.e., the time spent in the
local buffer. The average is over all (buffered) data
packets and over all the nodes in the network. The de-
lay before transmission is plotted in Figure 12(a). We
also observe the average displacement (Figure 12(b))
before packet transmission on the network, which is the
Euclidean distance between the location that the data
packet is originally scheduled at and the location it is
actually broadcast on the network. Both average delay
and average displacement are important QoS properties
because of the real-time and local (context-dependent)
nature of the data that is shared in pervasive social net-
works. The utility of the data in pervasive social net-
works is directly related to the delay and displacement
associated with it.
From Figure 12(a) and (b), we can observe that, for
any value of the confusion distance, the average delay
and displacement increases as the total number of nodes
in the network decreases. This is intuitive because as
the current privacy requirement for the data packets
is k-anonymity (with k = 6), fewer nodes in the net-
work would lead to sparser neighborhoods (and the k-
anonymity requirement not being satisfied) and even-
tually more waiting time or delay for the data packets.
As nodes are mobile, more wait time translates directly
to longer displacements. Another trend that we can
observe in these figures is that average delay and dis-
placement increases with a decrease in the confusion
distance. This is also easy to explain as a decrease in
the confusion distance makes it difficult to satisfy the
k-anonymity requirement for the data packets result-
ing in longer delays and displacements. One interesting
observation is that this increase is exponential when
the nodes follow a classical random waypoint mobil-
ity model. For example, the delay is 0.1 seconds for a
confusion distance of 250m, which increases to 10 sec-
onds for a confusion distance of 50m when there are
100 nodes in the network. As in this model, there are
at least 250000 end-points and nodes choose random
end-points (meeting points), when the confusion dis-
tance decreases it becomes extremely difficult to find
k-neighbors for privacy-triggering.
Another QoS related statistic that we observe is the
average device data buffer occupancy or the average
number of data packets in the buffer at any time. The
plot for buffer occupancy for the simulations using the
classical random waypoint model is shown in Figure 12(c).
From the figure, we can see that the buffer occupancy
increases with the decrease in the number of the nodes
in the network or in the confusion distance. This is also
intuitive because a decrease in the number of nodes or
the confusion distance makes it harder for nodes to sat-
isfy the k-anonymity requirement, as discussed earlier.
Similarly to the previous two plots, the buffer occu-
pancy increases exponentially with the decrease in the
confusion distance. The plot of buffer occupancy is also
consistent with the previous two results. Greater buffer
occupancy in nodes should lead to larger data packet
delays (and displacements), which is also evident from
the above plots.
7.2.2 Simulation Results for RWC Mobility Model
The results of the simulation runs using the random
waypoint model on a city map are outlined in Figures 12
(d),(e) and (f). Similar to the previous results, for each
simulation run the average delay before transmission
(Figure 12(d)), the average displacement before trans-
mission (Figure 12(e)) and the average buffer occupancy
(Figure 12(f)) are observed and plotted.
We can see from Figures 12 (d),(e) and (f) that the
plots of the simulation results for the random waypoint
model on a city map follow a very similar trend to those
for the classical random waypoint model as discussed in
Figures 12 (a),(b) and (c). Similar to the earlier results,
all the QoS properties, namely, average delay, average
displacement and average buffer occupancy, increase as
the number of nodes in the network decreases. Simi-
larly, the average delay, average displacement and av-
erage buffer occupancy also increase with the decrease
in the confusion distance. One main difference with
the earlier results is that the average delay, average dis-
placement and average buffer occupancy in this case are
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Figure 12: Simulation results: (a), (b) and (c) Classical random waypoint model with pauses; (d),
(e) and (f) Random waypoint on a city selection.
always higher as compared to the corresponding plots
for the classical random waypoint model. Moreover the
increase in the values of these properties with the con-
fusion distance is much slower as compared to the ear-
lier case. Another important observation that we make
from these results is that for the low values of confusion
distance (for example, 50m) and the total number of
nodes (for example, 20 and 40), there is no service. In
other words, none of the nodes are able to send out a
single data packet on the network.
Up to this point, we have seen that the system be-
haves in a predictable fashion in terms of the QoS re-
ceived by the users when their communications are pri-
vacy triggered. This clearly reflects the trade-off that
exists between privacy and QoS. Now, let us further
analyze the above simulation results to study the ef-
fect that node mobility has on the privacy-triggered
communication mechanism and how moving along re-
stricted paths (and a limited set of encounter points)
performs against moving randomly, from the point of
view of privacy-triggered communications.
7.3 Discussion
Let us compare the simulation results for the two dif-
ferent mobility models. From Figure 12, we observe
that on average the delay for the RWC model is higher
than the RW model, which is not surprising, given the
restricted motion of the nodes and the fewer meeting
points. For the classical RW model, assuming only in-
teger coordinates, there are at most 250,000 possible
meeting points as compared to 383 for the RWC model.
Even on scaling down the area used for the RWC model,
we get at most 2300 meeting points for the RWC case.
For the RW model with a node density of 8e-05 (20
nodes), the delays are 0.36, 1.67, 7, 38 and 610, all
in seconds, when the confusion distance decreases from
250m to 50m. For the RWC model with approximately
the same density of 7e−05 (100 nodes), the delays are 6,
18, 61, 210 and 678, all in seconds, when the confusion
distance decreases from 250m to 50m. For lower values
of the confusion distance, the difference in the delay be-
tween the two models is small. These results indicate
that privacy-triggered communications perform better
for the RW model as compared to the RWC model.
Let us see how these results translate to real-life sit-
uations. Large public gatherings such as markets, fairs,
sporting events, etc., are good situations for privacy-
triggered communication whereas walking or driving on
less crowded streets may not be so favorable. Large
public gatherings generally correspond to Points of In-
terest (POI), e.g., school, workplace, bus stops, etc.,
and people move towards these POIs. Intuitively, privacy-
triggered communication will work better as people ap-
proach a POI or are within a POI. For example, the
application does not communicate at all as a person is
walking towards a bus stop, but starts communicating
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as he reaches the bus stop or boards a bus.
One observation is that as users approach a POI (or
within a POI), the communications become bursty. This
leads to high congestion near and in the POIs. This also
leads to sharing lots of personal data at once. This can
be observed from the buffer occupancy results shown
in figures 12 (c) and (f). The average number of pack-
ets in the buffer per time interval for the RW model is
far less compared to the RWC model. There are more
encounters and thus regular communications in a RW
model than the RWC model, which leads to a much
more uniform traffic pattern. In order to overcome this
problem, one solution is to gradually start and resume
communications inside a POI where privacy is good.
Finally, our results show that privacy does not come
for free and the price to pay is to reduce the QoS. By
providing the necessary tools and services for privacy
regulation in such networks, we provide a better un-
derstanding of this tradeoff. In addition, our solution
enables users to make their own choice in this regard.
Those who prefer high privacy can have it, but at the
cost of a lower QoS.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of trigger-
ing communications based on privacy in peer-to-peer
wireless networks. First, we derived the requirements
to build privacy-triggered applications and showed that
it is not tied to any privacy metric. Then, we designed
and implemented the first operational prototype of this
concept on the Nokia N810 devices. By means of sim-
ulations, we showed how privacy-triggered communica-
tions affect the overall QoS provided by the system. In
particular, we showed that for the k-anonymity metric
the usability of privacy-triggered communication and
the resulting QoS depend not only on users privacy re-
quirements, but also on their mobility patterns. This
work is a first step towards providing privacy tools that
consider the wireless context to control user privacy. A
particularly interesting result of such approach is the
ability to regulate communications based on the user
environment.
For future work, we would like to test our prototype
with other privacy metrics as different classes of peo-
ple may have different privacy requirements. Moreover,
we would like to extend our current prototype to in-
tegrate some of the regulation tasks to the underlying
communication platform, and thus avoid user interven-
tion. Finally, we would also like to integrate an “always-
on” monitoring module with our current prototype to
continuously measure privacy, even when the main ap-
plication is turned-off.
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